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regarding the issues, challenges, and potential benefits of achieving medical device interoperability, and expanded that discussion to encompass other healthcare environments such as home health care and ambulatory practice. The agenda (Appendix A) included speakers from related academic and laboratory programs; an update on the work with the FDA on a new regulatory paradigm; breakout sessions to discuss high level clinical requirements and to articulate an initial plan for the MD PnP Lab; a demonstration of the potential of plug-and-play technology for medical devices, based on the LiveData, Inc, "RTI" integrated display system; two other lab technology demonstrations; and a discussion of potential system architecture solutions. With the focus on clinical requirements and planning the lab, this meeting moved the program from the conceptualizing phase to the planning and working phase.
Meeting highlights included:
• Broadening of the stakeholder community, while preserving existing interest
• Multiple attendees from new companies (including Cisco, Lockheed Martin, Olympus, Stryker, Smith & Nephew, and others) as well as from those already involved (including Draeger, GE Healthcare, Philips, LiveData, Datascope, IBM, and others)
• Consolidation and categorization of the high-level clinical requirements collected to date
• Articulation of issues and considerations for planning an MD PnP "sandbox" laboratory to evaluate proposed interoperability solutions and implement clinical use cases
• Preliminary definition of the value proposition for medical device interoperability
• Initial discussion of a framework for future organization and funding of the program
• Identification of paths for seeking and evaluating potential system architecture solutions
• Strong consensus for the PI to move the program forward to the next phase Talks given at the symposium were videotaped and subsequently made available as streaming video on the MD PnP (www.mdpnp.org) and CIMIT web sites (www.cimit.org). There have been almost 600 hits on these pages since they became available in February. Newcomers to the PnP program are referred to these talks, as well as those from the May 2004 TATRCsponsored kick-off symposium, as valuable background.
As with the kick-off symposium in May 2004, this symposium led to a series of related follow-up activities that have continued to broaden support for the MD PnP vision and goals. These have included ongoing work on refining clinical requirements into use cases, progress towards getting a PnP lab up and running, efforts to educate additional organizations in the value of medical device PnP, visits to other DoD-supported programs working on related efforts, and meetings with the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT.
The high level clinical requirements that we collected at a series of focus group sessions held at medical societies in FY05 were summarized with the help of a clinical engineer from Kaiser Permanente and presented at the June symposium in a breakout group, where they were further discussed and refined. In August, IBM hosted a two-day small group working meeting to organize clinical scenarios in an FDA-recommended framework. Participants in this meeting included Kaiser Permanente and the FDA, three IBM engineers and program managers, and the MD PnP PI and Project Manager. The session resulted in a set of clinical requirements that will help to inform engineering specifications. These results are being further reviewed, vetted with clinical groups, and extended to include additional requirements.
Subsequent to the June symposium, we developed a more complete articulation of the plan for the MD PnP Lab and the various roles it will play in advancing the goal of achieving MD PnP interoperability. A significant number of companies (Draeger Medical, LiveData, IBM, Philips, GE, and Datascope) and Partners HealthCare Information Systems have agreed to contribute equipment and engineering help, but additional funding will be needed to hire engineers to staff the Lab.
The web of collaborations for the MD PnP program began with the TATRC-sponsored May 2004 symposium and has continued to grow as a result of the June 2005 MD PnP symposium. These collaborations include activities and relationships with Federal agencies; clinical, engineering, and IT societies; clinicians in the USA, Europe, and Japan; and integrated health delivery networks.
Collaboration Highlights:
• The Society for Technology in Anesthesia (STA) stated their ongoing official support of the work and created an MD PnP working group that met with us for three hours at the STA annual meeting in January 2006 to review the clinical use case scenarios compiled during the past year and to add additional requirements where needed.
• The US FDA/CDRH has committed a resource to provide guidance on strategic planning for the program, methodology for interpreting user requirements, and guidance for implementing the MD PnP Lab.
• On the recommendation of Gen. 
Key Research Accomplishments
• Increased the momentum of the MD PnP program by further increasing the diverse, committed stakeholder community • Made excellent progress in refining the high-level clinical requirements elicited from anesthesiologists, surgeons, and clinical engineers • Maintained a close working relationship with FDA that involves frequent interaction and committed participation in this effort • Expanded collaborations with NSF, NIST, and University of Pennsylvania to include Draper Lab, Intel, and others, to enhance the quality and effectiveness of MD PnP subprojects, especially use case implementation in the Lab.
• Developed a clear vision and scope for the concept of a vendor-neutral laboratory, and progressed towards implementation of a prototype MD PnP Lab in calendar Q2 2006.
• Initiated high-level dialogue regarding the relationship of medical device interoperability to the national health IT agenda.
Reportable Outcomes
Meetings:
• 
MD PnP Laboratory Vision & Scope
High-acuity healthcare remains complex and potentially dangerous, in part because clinicians depend on teamwork and a patchwork of systems to mitigate hazards instead of using integrated "error resistant" safety systems and automated decision support. As a result of the lack of medical device interoperability, many self-evident improvements in data communication (e.g. shared and centralized information), device integration, and human factors have not been achieved, and patient safety and economic benefits not realized. Without medical device interoperability, goals of remote device control and closed-loop control systems cannot be attained. The Medical Device Plug-and-Play program was initiated to remove the barriers to implementing comprehensive clinical interoperability solutions that will facilitate the widespread clinical use of medical device data and network-based medical device control. These barriers include the absence of validated interoperability standards and specific clinical requirements, and legal and regulatory concerns.
We are creating a vendor-neutral MD PnP Lab "sandbox" populated with medical devices that will serve as the focal point of the MD PnP program. The MD PnP Lab will be used to demonstrate and assess clinical examples of interoperability-based safety solutions, beginning with intra-operative care. Our experience implementing the Operating Room of the Future at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) will inform this process. During the past year, we elicited clinical scenarios from over 200 clinicians and clinical engineers at multiple meetings throughout the United States to identify examples in which the deployment of medical device interoperability standards could improve patient safety and healthcare efficiency in the perioperative environment. Selected "high-level clinical use-cases" will be implemented in the MD PnP Lab in order to study their potential clinical utility and to inform the selection, development, and implementation of candidate interoperability standards. Once vetted, candidate standards will be incorporated into an "MD PnP standardization framework" that will serve as an umbrella standard for medical device interoperability.
We will continue to draw on clinical resources to assure that clinical requirements remain the foundation of the derived technical specifications, and plan to coordinate the work with the Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) program of the Health Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) to support cross-domain interoperability.
The MD PnP Lab must meet the challenge of networking currently available medical devices that do not use standardized network and communication interfaces, in order to create an appropriate development environment to (1) evaluate clinical scenarios, (2) investigate the performance of candidate medical device interoperability standards, (3) develop reference implementations of selected standards that are optimized for medical device PnP environments, and (4) document the benefits and limitations with respect to clinical and technical requirements. Fortunately, a vendor that has successfully deployed a system with the capability of networking disparate non-standardized devices in the OR of the Future has volunteered resources to deploy that system in the MD PnP Lab. This example of a non-standardized networked environment will provide a platform for rapid prototyping of standards-based solutions. Other vendors and governmental agencies have committed to support the Lab with donations of medical devices and engineering support.
The national impetus to improve Healthcare IT has been accelerated through bi-partisan support from the Executive and Legislative branches of government. The broad appeal of the MD PnP program is due in part to the alignment of its goals with pent-up national healthcare demands for interoperability. The MD PnP Lab will support the national health IT initiative by leveraging the consensus model of the MD PnP Program (with diverse clinical, vendor, and governmental involvement -including the FDA and DoD) to encourage broad stakeholder involvement and lead the adoption of interoperability solutions. We expect the MD PnP Lab to evolve into a national resource for Medical Device 
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REVISITING THE PAST
There is no free lunch, of course. That software brings risks of its own to healthcare technology was not news in 1999. Six years before To Err Is Human, Computer published an evaluation of the Therac-25 accidents in which Nancy Leveson and Clark Turner provided what retrospectively may be seen as a "warning shot" regarding the impact of software on medical technology. 2 Under "Lessons Learned," they quoted a medical physicist:
We have assumed … manufacturers have all kinds of safety design experience since they've been in the business a long time. We know that there are many safety codes, guides, and regulations to guide them and we have been reassured by the hitherto excellent record of these machines … Perhaps, though, we have been spoiled by this success.
The authors go on to note:
If we assign software error as the cause of the Therac-25 accidents, we are forced to conclude that the only way to prevent such accidents in the future is to build perfect software that will never behave in an unexpected Systems and software engineering contribute not only to advancing and improving the delivery of healthcare but also to doing it more safely than has been the case in the past.
Richard A. Schrenker
Massachusetts General Hospital T urning "To err is human, but to really screw up, you need a computer" on its head, in 1999 the Institute of Medicine's To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health Care System recommended 1 that healthcare professionals focusing on patient safety should increase their understanding of how information technology could be applied to deliver safer care. This recommendation was made as part of the approach to reducing errors in the delivery of care leading to the death of as many as 98,000 US citizens annually.
Much of the subsequent response to that challenge has focused on increasing the capabilities of enterprise hospital and clinical information systems-for example, implementing order-entry systems to check for drug allergies when writing prescriptions. But IT and patient care also come together at the bedside in the medical equipment and instrumentation systems used to deliver direct patient care-for example, smart infusion pumps that help ensure that the right dose of the right drug is administered to the right patient.
The articles in this special issue will touch on both types of systems, while focusing primarily on the application of software and systems engineering to softwarebased medical devices and device systems used at the bedside. They also note that "Although using good software engineering practices will not prevent all software errors, it is certainly required as a minimum" and that "Safety is a quality of the system in which the software is used; it is not a quality of the software itself."
Software
These warnings echo in the enterprise domain as well. In "Some Unintended Consequences of Information Technology in Health Care: The Nature of Patient Care Information System-Related Errors," Joan Ash and colleagues cite examples of PCIS failures that led to decreased safety, the opposite intent of its design. 3 They recommend that "developers and vendors should be clearer about the limitations of their technologies."
That said, today's limitations may have been yesterday's advanced features. Given the increasing rate of change of technological innovation and its introduction into healthcare delivery, it is not surprising to find different vintages of similar systems simultaneously available in clinical practice. This in turn can lead to originally unanticipated user expectations being applied to older systems, potentially resulting in unintended consequences not only in their application but also for developers, as described in the "Healthcare Professionals' Perceptions of Medical Software and What to Do About It" sidebar by Phillip A. Laplante and coauthors.
A similar problem is reflected at the point of delivery of care, where an increasing number of medical devices are embedded systems with complexity and capabilities that exceed products from just a few years ago.
Providing care to any one patient is likely to require multiple devices, particularly for the more acutely ill. The instrumentation at an intensive care bedside will minimally include a physiologic monitoring system to acquire, process, communicate, display, and generate appropriate alarms for ECG, one or more blood pressure devices, and devices for monitoring oxygen saturation, cardiac output, respiration, and other key parameters. Other devices likely to be in use will include infusion pumps (smart or otherwise) and a ventilator. Equipment that can be brought in as needed includes dialysis systems and laboratory equipment such as automated blood and chemistry analyzers.
Some patients will need all of the above and perhaps more; others will present different needs. Assuring the readiness and availability of this equipment requires having a robust and reliable medical technology management system.
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Responding to the demands of the patient care environment requires (among other things) hospital medical equipment inventories that are not only well-stockedwe currently manage more than 18,000 devices for our approximately 1,000-bed hospital-but fairly dynamic as well. New equipment-and new makes, types, and models of equipment-is added continuously, often replacing outdated equipment, but sometimes providing new functionality. Consequent human factors as well as technical and user training issues require ongoing monitoring and attention. None of this is terribly new, but the addition of software-based medical devices adds more wrinkles. Henry Petroski's 4 admonition is worth remembering:
Any design change … can introduce new failure modes or bring into play latent failure modes. Thus it follows that any design change, no matter how seemingly benign or beneficial, must be analyzed with the objectives of the original design in mind.
Managing software versions, installing patches, or placing devices on shared network infrastructures are examples of activities that are already introducing new sets of problems to the clinical environment, including some that have yet to manifest themselves.
Manufacturers, regulators-for example, the FDAand medical equipment users all have played roles in the evolution of medical technology management systems that have brought us to this point. Viewing the process from 30,000 feet, manufacturers develop a device; regulators approve it for sale; and users buy, use, and maintain it. But it is not clear whether this model will remain sustainable going forward, as clinical demands driving technological responses appear to point to the need for a less linear and more collaborative process among the involved parties. For example, currently there is little in the way of standards-based interoperability among medical devices, even in the presence of ongoing efforts like IEEE 11073, which date back to the early 1990s.
Why these efforts have yet to succeed is not fully clear even to those of us who have been involved. However, over the past few years, a movement has started to take shape that is characterized not only by increased collaboration, but also by users taking a more active role in establishing the vision for future systems and deriving the requirements to which manufacturers and regulators need to respond.
Active 1 In this case, a computerized physician order entry system deployed at the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center came under fire.The article concluded that, contrary to conventional belief, a CPOE system might actually increase the number of medication errors as compared to a manual, handwritten system.
As faculty working at a graduate center with the mission of advancing the profession of software engineering, we were aghast at the implications (accusations, really) of the study reported in this article-that the software engineering employed in the development of this system was deficient or delinquent and was therefore an indication that our discipline is itself lacking. Particularly disconcerting was how the mainstream media picked up the article and further promoted the notion that software engineers were failing the medical profession.
Physicians' Perceptions of Software Engineering Practices
The Eclipsys CPOE system scrutinized in this study apparently was deployed from 1997 until 2004.When we contacted them, Eclipsys employees confirmed that because it had screens that were "usually monochromatic with preWindows interfaces," this was probably an older-generation system.
In any case, the conclusions drawn in the JAMA article about CPOE system design can be stated as follows:
• Focus primarily on the organization of the work, not on technology.
• Aggressively examine the technology in use.
• Aggressively fix technology when it is shown to be counterproductive.
• Pursue errors' "second stories" and multiple causations to surmount barriers enhanced by episodic and incomplete error reporting.
• Plan for continuous revisions and quality improvement,recognizing that all changes generate new error risks.
These are logical recommendations to derive from the study of a legacy system clearly developed with outmoded methodologies and technologies. Unfortunately, the study's authors chose to impute these findings on every CPOE system and neglected to mention the aged nature of this particular application-a fact that also was not noted by any of the media outlets that further promulgated the study's assertions.
To the further discredit of the software engineering profession, this study focused on the perceptions of system users who were unlikely to accept blame for their own errors or acknowledge their own inadequacies with respect to using the system.When the option is to accept fault yourself or to blame your tools, which would you choose?
The State of the Art?
We accept that in the past the industry has been sullied by well-publicized disasters caused by poorly designed medical software systems, most notably the Therac-25 debacle. 2 But it is incumbent on the software engineering profession to both publicize the advances that have been made in the past decade and to actively apply those advances.
For example, because the Eclipsys CPOE system was designed more than a decade ago, its developers most likely employed a waterfall life-cycle model.That the system failed to match the user community's needs and workflow is, therefore, no surprise. 3 Numerous advances in software engineering have thoroughly addressed the software deficiencies that the critics of these medical software systems discovered.These advances include the growth of the subdisciplines of requirements engineering (focused on the gathering, documentation, and analysis of user requirements), user-interface design (focused on the design and construction of intuitive and safe user interfaces), and usability engineering (focused on the study of ease of use and suitability for purpose).
In addition to an improved software engineering paradigm, others have identified the need for better embedded medical device user interfaces to reduce errors. 4 We believe that software engineers should focus more attention on the usability aspects of medical systems, whether they are embedded or not.The greatest risk in not doing so are the kinds of medical errors uncovered in studies that rightfully criticize the failure to adopt good software engineering practices.The less obvious risk, however, is that failure to address usability elephant, our perception of the scope of the application of information technology to healthcare is largely influenced by where we encounter the system. Virtually all of us can relate to issues associated with medical data records management, making it easier to appreciate the Institute of Medicine's recommendations for enterpriselevel and larger information systems. Although less visible to the public, visions are beginning to take shape that are also national in scope but more focused on technologies used in the direct provision of care.
In "High-Confidence Medical Device Software and Systems," Insup Lee and colleagues describe a national issues degrades the overall confidence that medical professionals have in software solutions even when an appropriate software engineering process has been used for all other aspects of the system except the user interface.
Ironically, contemporary requirements engineering techniques include many of the investigatory techniques employed by physician-researchers who study medical systems. Joint application development employs focus groups of project stakeholders so that each involved party is represented in the requirements elicitation stage. Use case analysis employs userscripted scenarios of interaction to ensure that the computer system enforces a workflow and mode of operation that reflects not only the policies and procedures that must be met, but also the ways of working that the users themselves favor. Contextual inquiry and ethnography involve user shadowing and observation so that the analysts and developers involved in constructing the information system have a sufficient understanding of the problem domain to ensure that the delivered application conforms with current practice where necessary and optimizes current practices where possible. Other techniques such as using formal methods address the issue of ensuring that the code is correct and behaves according to the rules that the healthcare professionals determine.
These innovations within the software engineering community have been developed, or have been more widely adopted, since the deployment of many of the medical systems that have come under criticism.These techniques ensure that the delivered system does all that the users want and need and that the correct checks and balances are in place so that humanmachine interface flaws and information errors do not arise.
Finally, we observe that many clinical systems currently in use were created prior to the recent, dramatic changes in healthcare delivery. Integrated health networks with more complex workflows and a greater need for seamless movement of patient data on demand, anywhere within the network, have for the most part replaced free-standing hospitals, clinics, and group practices. Retrofitting yesterday's systems to meet today's needs can only result in a "solution" that falls short, as the JAMA study clearly demonstrates.
Software engineers have long known that extensive retrofitting causes software to age very rapidly. Considering what we do know about building complex software systems and in the light of these dramatic changes in the industry, it is unfortunate that the prevailing sentiment among healthcare professionals seems to be that legacy information systems, their developers, and their vendors are failing to meet the needs of physicians and hospitals.
Moving Forward
The message that should be delivered is that hospital administrators must push for modern computer systems rather than taking the cheap way out and trying to adapt outdated technology. Further, healthcare professionals have a role to play in the specification, validation, and deployment of complex software systems such as CPOE.The burden to deliver correct and usable applications isn't entirely on the software engineers and software vendors. Software engineering professionals must be proactive in educating healthcare professionals about the role they must play in building systems that are responsive to their needs and are reliable and safe.
As it turns out, several major medical systems developers-Eclipsys, Siemens Medical Solutions, and McKesson HBOC-are all located near our campus, and some of our best students hail from these companies.Therefore, we know that, whatever the state of affairs was 10 or 20 years ago, at least some representatives of the medical software community are now applying state-of-the-art software engineering techniques in the development of medical informatics systems-including design for usability.
As a profession, we must get the word out to healthcare providers that the state of affairs in software engineering has improved dramatically.
collaborative effort involving academics and professionals working together to identify and address the critical issues presented by the emergence of intelligent clinical technologies.
Vision meets reality
Moving from vision to product requires not only attention to good software engineering practices and awareness of the regulatory environment, but also a grounding in fundamental risk management principles. Steven R. Rakitin explores all three in "Coping with Defective Software in Medical Devices."
Reality meets New Age: How can we not use agile methods?
In "IGSTK: An Open Source Software Toolkit for Image-Guided Surgery," Kevin Gary and colleagues start with a description of the critical requirements posed by the needs of image-guided surgery that, when coupled with the resources available to his team, result in daunting development constraints. The authors describe the development and application of a mixture of classical and agile tools and methods in support of their clinical application.
Wireless changes everything
In many institutions, it once was easy to partition medical and nonmedical networked devices by installing them on physically distinct wired networks. That degree of control effectively came to an end with the introduction of wireless medical device networks. In A patient undergoing gallbladder surgery is under general anesthesia during the procedure.To avoid image blurring while taking X-ray images during the surgery, it is necessary to switch off the ventilator that is breathing for the anesthetized patient.Turning the ventilator off, taking the X-ray, and turning the ventilator back on again are all manual processes. If the team of caregivers is distracted, it is possible that the ventilator might not be turned back on.Although very unlikely, this tragedy has occurred (www.apsf.org/ resource_center/newsletter/2004/winter/03turn_on.htm).
This scenario is one of many involving ensembles of standalone medical devices in which each acts as a stand-alone device, with its only sources of information coming from the operator and sensors. If the X-ray machine and ventilator were context-aware and able to communicate with one another, synchronization of the X-ray exposure to the phase of ventilation could minimize the need to turn off the ventilator, substantially reducing the potential for the disaster described above.The same approach could improve image quality and decrease wasted images and unnecessary X-ray exposure when X-rays are taken in the intensive care unit.
But the state of the art with respect to medical device interoperability is reflected in a small number of proprietary products that provide some capabilities geared primarily at populating patient record systems and single-vendor "integrated" networked systems. Despite almost 20 years of attempting to define standards that enable medical device interoperability, little real progress has been made in terms of delivering solutions to the market, particularly for problems involving emergent, real-time patient care.
The absence of market-ready interoperability solutions has stalled the development of fully integrated electronic health records, smart alarms, real-time clinical decision support systems, and automated safety systems (with medical device interlocks). As a result, clinicians cannot easily use technology to enhance situational awareness or control devices in the clinical environment, and they must continue to rely instead on teamwork and a patchwork of systems to mitigate clinical hazards.
Inspired by successes such as the Operating Room of the Future (ORF) program at Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and driven as much by frustration at not being able to provide the "latent opportunities" of innovation in clinical care that we know modern technology could support, as well as by the rapidly changing economics and dynamics of the patient care environment, we in the user community are beginning to respond.
In our case, we have established a program to fully address medical device interoperability to support the development of connected, error-resistant medical device systems throughout the continuum of healthcare. Over the past two years, the Medical Device Plug-and-Play Interoperability Program (MD PnP; www.mdpnp.org), founded by the Center for the Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology (CIMIT; www.cimit.org/orfuture.html) and MGH, has surveyed clinical groups representing leading surgeons, anesthesiologists, nurses, and clinical engineers to acquire the information needed to derive use cases and drive requirements definitions.We are converting selected clinical use cases into pro-of placing such a system into service. They also examine the subtleties driving the need for hospital-based clinical engineering involvement in system verification and validation.
Everything Changes FDA
Cognizant of issues like the ones that challenged Gary's team, regulators are faced with determining how to respond to issues that emerge with the rapid evolution of software-based medical devices. In "A Formal Methods Approach to Medical Device Review," Raoul Jetley and colleagues describe a set of formal approaches for application test and validation during the premarket approval process or when doing a forensic analysis of problems that occur after a device has been delivered to the market.
I ndeed, to err is human. But it does not follow that harm cannot be prevented. Systems and software engineering contribute not only to advancing and improving the delivery of care but also to doing it more safely than has been the case in the past. Doing so appears likely to require greater collaboration between manufacturers, regulators, and users in the future. And it is happening.
But more needs to be done, and soon. While the work that the IHE and MD PnP are doing makes many of us hopeful that interoperable medical device systems will soon begin to be realized, hard questions need to be asked, such as, Why did IEEE 11073 move so slowly? What more needs to happen for its vision to be realized in the market? What could we do differently to avoid similar inertia when tackling future systems and software engineering problems? totype models to be implemented in our MD PnP Lab with commercially available medical devices.
The MD PnP Lab is implementing the gallbladder imaging scenario as the first clinical use case around which to begin to define, select, or develop the processes, tools, framework, and components with which to construct the needed system. Throughout the MD PnP program, it is our intent to reuse and leverage existing work wherever possible, and we will support the use of currently existing consensus standards if they can contribute to the implementation of these clinical use cases.We are also acutely aware that other significant challenges, such as data security, liability and regulatory issues, network performance monitoring, and interoperability with the broader healthcare enterprise must also be addressed.
The impetus for the MD PnP program relies on both the visionary and real foundation provided by the ORF along with the collaboration and extended vision of its members.The ORF, a program of CIMIT and MGH, is a fully functioning OR suite in MGH.The ORF serves as a "living laboratory" for clinicians, engineers, technicians, architects, and administrators to study the impact of process change, technology, and teamwork on safety and productivity.The ORF also serves as a protected environment and aggregation point to develop and safely validate and test those ideas, including MD PnP, that are envisioned as necessary to lay the foundation for safety and efficiency innovations in perioperative healthcare.
The MD PnP "geographically dispersed team" includes not only members of Partners HealthCare clinical, information services, and clinical engineering staff but also colleagues from other integrated healthcare delivery networks (IHDNs) such as Kaiser Permanente; marketing and engineering staff from medical device manufacturers; FDA and NIST staff involved in the regulation and testing of software-based medical devices; marketing and engineering staff representing manufacturers of information technology-based hardware and software; and members of academic and research communities. The continued lack of automated safety systems, smart alarms, closed-loop control, and decision support systems at the patient bedside, coupled with the tacit acceptance of resultant risks that thereby accrue, is unconscionable in the presence of readily available technology that is applied to similar goals seemingly everywhere but healthcare.We in the MD PnP program are intent on addressing it.
The involvement of experts from outside the medical technology domain could prove valuable. For example, researchers might be better positioned to help us more rigorously address emerging issues such as whether medical device networks should merge with hospital or other clinical information systems networks. And, jumping even further outside the box, consideration needs to be given to how healthcare-based engineers, caregivers, and technologists can become even more engaged in technology definition, development, and design decisions and activities, to, for example, address human factors issues that will likely increase with device and system complexity.
Medicine remains fundamentally reactive; we wonder how it can be otherwise. A person can do everything possible to remain healthy, but sooner or later, if an accident doesn't strike, illness will. When this occurs, clinicians attending to the patient remain driven by the basic principle, "First, do no harm," and they expect that the tools they use will not permit their violating that principle.
To address patient safety in the face of the perturbations that arise from human error as well as other sources, proactive systems and software engineering attention must increasingly focus on continuously creating robust, reliable, and dependable applications and an infrastructure focused on addressing needs at the point of delivery of care. ■ This infrastructure would consist of standards for connectivity, system interoperability, data content and exchange, applications and laws." 3 The absence of effective medical device connectivity has been due in part to an absence of implemented open standards, the lack of financial incentives for device manufacturers to provide systems to support vendor-independent connectivity, legal and regulatory concerns and unclear clinical specifications -or "clinical requirements" -for the proposed systems.
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The national HIT agenda includes making the interoperability of electronic health care records (EHR) a reality, but we are concerned that EHRs will be neither complete nor accurate until the inclusion of medical device data is automated.
There are two distinct, and closely related, facets of medical device interoperability:
• Data communication standards will support accurate data acquisition by the EHR from monitors, infusion pumps, ventilators, portable imaging systems and other hospital and home-based medical devices. Reliable data will support complete and accurate EHRs and robust databases for continued quality improvement • Medical device control standards will permit the control of medical devices to produce "error-resistant" systems with safety interlocks between medical devices to decrease use errors, closed-loop systems to regulate the delivery of medication and fluids and remote patient management to support health care efficiency and safety (e.g., remote intensive care unit, management of infected/contaminated casualties).
The Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MD PnP) program was initiated in May 2004 at the Center for Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology, or CIMIT, and Massachusetts General Hospital to identify and implement connectivity standards while ensuring that they remain clinically grounded <www.mdpnp.org>. 4, 5 The program has convened diverse stakeholders (clinicians, the Food and Drug Administration, manufacturers, biomedical and clinical engineers, clinical societies and others) to develop a roadmap for open-standards-based, vendorneutral medical device interoperability. The early identification of the importance of basing interoperability solutions on clinical requirements led us to begin compiling the unique body of clinical requirements represented in the examples above. The clinical requirements were elicited from clinicians and engineers who were asked to provide examples of connectivity that could a) solve current clinical problems, b) improve safety or efficiency or c) enable innovative clinical systems of the future. A major goal is to identify potential solutions to perceived shortcomings of current clinical practice or ideas for future innovations that require improved interoperability for implementation. The MD PnP Lab, scheduled to open in the second quarter of 2006, provides a vendor-neutral environment in which to evaluate the feasibility of implementing some of these clinical scenarios, including evaluating connectivity products and standards as they are developed. The Lab thus provides the protected environment that will enable latent opportunities for improving patient safety to be explored and realized.
We will hold an open session at the ASA 2006 Annual Meeting in Chicago to gather your clinical requirements for inclusion in the master requirements list, which will guide national solutions. Feel free to get started now by sending your ideas to us at <asa@mdpnp.org> or posting your ideas and initiating discussion on the discussion area of <www.mdpnp.org> (free registration required to post information).
